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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Seeing Through the Aesthetic Worldview
(pp141-150)

ANDREW LAMBERT

Introduction: The Chinese aesthetic tradition
When assessing David Hall and Roger Ames’s claim that the classical Confucian
tradition is an aesthetic tradition, comprising an aesthetic order,1 a comment by the philosopher
J.L. Austin on the relationship between language and truth is insightful. Austin asks whether the
claim “France is hexagonal” is true or false.2 When teaching children to recognize countries on a
map, for example, it might be considered true; but to the professional geographer it might be
false. Austin, however, suggests that it is neither true nor false, but a meaningful and suggestive
“rough description.”
A similar defense could be made for Hall and Ames’s claim that the classical Confucian
tradition be understood as constituting an aesthetic order. Some have argued that this claim is
simply false.3 However, following Austin, this claim should be understood not in terms of its
literal truth or falsity, but in terms of its usefulness and suggestiveness. It is a general description
that can guide inquiry into early Chinese thought. In what follows, I locate Hall and Ames’s
“aesthetic order” within a broader interpretive lineage that understands the Chinese tradition as

1

an aesthetic tradition. I show how conceptions of “aesthetic” evolve within that lineage, how
Hall and Ames built upon earlier New Confucians, and how their work might be extended further.
Post-imperial China sought a Chinese modernity true to China’s classical tradition while
adjusting to Western influence. This led several modern Chinese thinkers to articulate how some
notion of the aesthetic has been central to Chinese culture and society. Cai Yuanpei, for example,
called for aesthetic education (meiyu 美育) to replace religion. While religion crudely incited the
emotions, aesthetic education would instead cultivate more refined feelings and gradually
eliminate selfishness.4 Xu Fuguan noted how, historically, aesthetic vocabulary applied in the
realms of music, art, and painting evolved into descriptions of the characteristics of outstanding
men.5 Others identified the aesthetic qualities that characterize the Chinese humanistic tradition
as a whole. Zong Baihua developed shengming meixue, roughly “life aesthetics,” which stressed
the centrality of art and an aesthetic attitude towards life and, more broadly, the cosmos.6
Similarly, some accounts of tianren heyi (the unity of humanity and the cosmos) stress the
centrality of beauty. Li Zehou argues that humanity is evolving toward a final higher state, in
which human psychology evolves to recognize beauty as the highest value.7
The view that aesthetics is central to human conduct and social order derives from the
cosmology articulated in the classical corpus. As New Confucian thinker Tang Junyi notes, “The
spirit of Chinese literature and art are closely related to Chinese philosophers’ natural
cosmology.”8 This cosmology has traditionally been described as “ceaseless generation”
(shengsheng buxi). The Great Treatise on the Book of Changes reads:

The successive movement between yin and yang forces is what is called “dao” and that
which follows from this movement is good (shan) … The benevolent see it and call it
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benevolence. The wise see it and call it wisdom. The common people act according to it
in everyday life but do not recognize it … daily renewal is known as abundant potency,
ceaseless generation is what is known as “change.”9

On this view, the world is a site of ceaseless transformation. Such transformation is found at
many levels, from the movement between night and day, to the cyclical rotation of the seasons,
through to the ongoing biological processes that sustain every living cell. Furthermore, as
expressed by tianren heyi and Tang’s notion of yiduo bufenguan (the inseparability of the
singular and the multiplicity),10 humanity is embedded at the center of this vibrant and
organically structured cosmos. Such a view has implications for aesthetics and its role in shaping
human conduct, which the New Confucians in particular explored. The simplest connection is
that the unified world, with its harmony and vitality, is the paradigm of beauty. Closely related to
this is the effect of this integrated whole on human sensibility and affective response. For Tang
Junyi, the beauty of this “vital, rich, and continuous process of transformation” leads subjects to
a reverence for all life that influences thought and action.11 Such thinking hints at a quasi-causal
account linking this processual world to human action. There is a confidence that the inherent
vitality of the living natural world can directly evoke human emotions.12 A person with the
appropriately cultivated sensibilities will feel emotions present, in some sense, in reality itself.
Such a causal connection might be understood as the energies or qi that circulate in the putatively
external world but also permeate the body and produce emotions; it might also be captured in
ideas such as resonance, where the human mind becomes attuned to a wider field of patterns.
Regardless of mechanism, this link between the world and the emotions is seen in Chinese art,
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especially painting, which Fang Dongmei notes is “nothing more nor less than the expression of
exuberant vitality. I take this to be foundation of all forms of Chinese art.”13

The tradition of theorizing the aesthetic and Thinking Through Confucius

Hall and Ames’s work might be considered as a continuation of this New Confucian
project, since their account of the classic Chinese tradition as an aesthetic tradition also starts
from recognition of some kind of comprehensive unity between humans and the world. Their
approach, however, holds out the promise of avoiding metaphysical or causal problems facing
these earlier accounts, in which attempts to link a world of processual transformation directly
with human emotion struggled to find a causal explanation of how such correlation could arise.
Hall and Ames, however, emphasize a different conception of aesthetic. In their account, this
unity is understood not in terms of metaphysical or causal connection, but through aesthetic
judgment. This conception utilizes a Whiteheadian metaphysical framework, whereby the
holistic cosmology is now understood as giving rise not to emotions but to an aesthetic order.
The starting point in theories of aesthetic order is the claim that reality cannot be
understood as a rule-governed or principled order, which Hall and Ames call a “rational order.”14
Reflecting the traditional cosmology, this view denies that the multiplicity can be explained by
any theory or set of final principles. Instead, the most complete order possible in such a world is
understood in aesthetic terms. At its simplest such order can be understood by analogy with the
arts, such as painting, where particular elements (e.g., line, form, color, and so on) are brought
together to create an aesthetically pleasing effect. “Aesthetic” is used “to name the sort of order
comprised by particulars construed precisely in terms of their particularity.”15 The same applies
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to the creation of an ideal social order. Each element of society is to be optimally arranged,
where attainment is marked by such phenomena as a sense of appropriateness or ease, the
integration of different social roles, and the lack of social conflict.16 In avoiding appeal to
foundational principles, this account also avoids the problem of providing epistemological
justification for such principles.
This notion of the aesthetic generates a practical task, the creation of social order, which
is taken up by exemplary persons (junzi). Through judgment and action, exemplary persons
influence other elements in the field, such as the common people (min), inducing them into an
order formed around exemplary persons.17 The Pole Star reference in Analects 2.1 and the
references to modeling or setting an example express this ideal.18 This ongoing and subtle
reordering of the community distinguishes the Confucian tradition from a reactionary social
order mired in inflexible social convention.
Here the meaning of “aesthetic” shifts from passive response to active intuitive judgment.
Although this aesthetic order can be described objectively or impersonally, its foundation resides
in individual aesthetic judgments of “rightness”19 or “appropriateness” (yi).20 The exemplary
person senses the optimal way of ordering the various elements involved: “The direct
entertainment of one’s environs entails no conceptual or ideational mediation. The environing
world as in some sense ‘felt’ rather than cognitively entertained consists in ungeneralized
particulars.”21 Such aesthetic order thus provides an iteration of Confucian harmony.
This account of an aesthetic order has encountered several familiar objections. These
include the claim that classical China does have transcendence and thus a higher ordering force,
while others have criticized the allegedly reductive dichotomy of the rational and aesthetic,
particular where it suggests an essentializing East-West dichotomy. I will not repeat these
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concerns here, nor possible replies to them.22 Instead, I will focus on one specific challenge,
which also serves as a stepping-stone to a further conception of the aesthetic that might extend
Hall and Ames’s insights.
This concern is that the kinds of human response that follow from the account of a
processual and transforming world might be broader than the “aesthetic order” paradigm
suggests. Stated another way, the practical wisdom of the exemplary person is not grounded
solely in felt aesthetic response. The practical rationality of the exemplary person featured in the
Analects is more diverse than a sensing of the optimal order of particulars. Other aspects of
Confucian psychology and practical judgment seem equally important to creating social order.
One such example is the cultivated sense of obligation. This is most clear in certain human bonds,
such as father and son. The Analects frequently portrays commitments to kin in terms of a
“categorical” quality of experience (the felt duty to uphold one’s father’s way for three years, to
cover for his sheep-stealing, not to cause undue worry to parents, and so on). Unlike an aesthetic
sensitivity to the whole, certain concerns seem qualitatively more important and, in some cases,
overriding. Xu Fuguan’s alternative gloss on the Chinese tradition as a culture of “anxious
concern” (youhuan yishi) captures such dispositions.23
Another point of contrast is the Analects’ concern with deliberative reflection about
conduct. The three kinds of daily reflection demanded in Analects 1.4 suggest a role for selfconscious deliberation in good conduct. Similarly, Mencius 4A17’s approval of a man touching
the hand of a drowning sister in order to save her is an endorsement of the deliberative weighing
of options and recognition of reasonable exceptions to a rule (quan). Here practical reasoning
does not take the form of felt or sensed response, but is deliberate and structured in its thought
patterns. Finally, the classical texts’ composite account of practical wisdom incorporates habitual
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responses—responses that are automatic and fitting but involve no affective state. Ritual
responses, for example, can be fluent and appropriate without reliance on any obvious sensed
feeling of rightness. In summary, then, what makes the exemplary person exemplary seems to be
not solely action or judgment grounded in the felt experience of particulars and a sensed order
among them. Confucian social order seems to involve more than aesthetic order.
Building on Hall and Ames’s creative reinvigoration of Confucian thought through an
appreciation of the role of the aesthetic in the Confucian tradition, we might consider an
additional Confucian sense of “aesthetic” that also contributes to social order: the practical
concern to create aesthetic goods within everyday social life. This account also draws on
Whitehead for relevant conceptual resources, while incorporating the Deweyan instrumentalism
of Ames’s later work.

Thinking through Ames

This alternative account of the aesthetic does not focus on aesthetic awareness as the
basis of intuitive judgments of appropriateness; instead, the creation of certain kinds of shared
affective experiences becomes the aim or goal of practical judgment and action.
This creative adaptation draws on Whitehead’s notions of an event. Whitehead explains
events as the “final real things of which the world is made up.… drops of experience, complex
and interdependent.”24 For Whitehead, such events are the significant phases of concrete
experience and the points at which interpenetrating forces merge. Here I focus on events that
arise in first-person experiences and the quality of experience attained when constitutive
elements or possibilities are brought together in the right way, producing “satisfaction.”25 In this
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way the notion of event is given a narrower, explicitly interpersonal and social gloss more
directly applicable to classical Confucian thought. The latter also values events, understood as
social interactions that are distinguished by their affective qualities. This concern with the quality
of experience and its aesthetic dimension is manifested in the texts’ concern with musicality (yue)
and its correlate, joy or delight (le). The affective experiences to which such terms point can be
thought of as “events” or “occasions,” which arise not simply in music but in appropriately
ordered social life.
The importance of 樂 (yue/le) to action in the classical texts appears in various guises.26
The Analects does not accord 樂 (yue/le) the same coverage as general moral terms such as ren
or de, but it is often attributed high value or even priority.27 In 6.20, for example, delight is
placed above knowledge (zhi) and even liking (hao). More importantly, when Confucius asks his
followers what they would most like to do in 11.26, he identifies most strongly with Zengxi’s
answer about taking delight in shared company—bathing with friends in the River Yi and
singing together while strolling home. Similarly, in 7.32 Confucius delights in singing harmonies
with his students. Furthermore, the importance of delight as a general state of mind is expressed
in two ways. First, a state of delight can resist the vicissitudes of life. Yan Hui is the paradigm of
residing in such delight,28 but the ideal of having reliable access to such a state over time appears
elsewhere.29 In general, the Analects’ valuing of music and its effects on the subject’s conscious
life reinforce the value of aesthetic experience, as well as indicating how it is analogous to
musical experience. Passage 7.14 indicates the intensity of the states that music produces—
listening to the Shao music obliterates Confucius’s sensitivity to lesser experiences, such as
hunger.30
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Perhaps the most explicitly social gloss on le is found in the Mencius. Here it is described
as the fruit of well-ordered human relationships:

The greatest fruit (shi) of humaneness (ren) is serving one’s parents. The greatest fruit of
rightness (yi) is going along with one’s elder brother … The greatest fruit of music is
taking joy (le) in these two. When there is joy, they grow. When they grow, how can they
be stopped? When they come to the point where they cannot be stopped then, without
realizing it, one’s feet begin to step in time and one’s hands begin to dance.

Significantly, le here is not simply a pleasant feeling, but emerges from social interaction, and
confirms when it has gone well. In addition, Mencius also articulates the metaphysical and
political dimensions of delight. Several dialogues in Book 1 explain how delight is increased by
sharing (by rulers with the people),31 how the right character is needed to appreciate appropriate
delight,32 and that it is the ruler’s duty to create and share delight with the people.33 Confucian
delight is thus more than mere hedonism or private pleasure; it has social and political
dimensions. Delight also has cosmological significance in the Mencius.34
Further research is needed to fully articulate the importance of musical or delightful
events to Confucian thought.35 Here I can offer just two further comments. The first is the
importance to this account of ordered social relationships and roles, which are themselves so
central to Confucian thought. Indeed, these relationships might be the main context within which
events arise, with interactions within them being the primary source of delight; at least, the
prominence of social and personal attachment in the early Confucian texts invites further
exploration of this claim.
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Second, the creation of such delight-based events is an ethical task. Focusing on the
Kong-Zisi-Meng lineage, the Zhongyong hints that the good life consists in the skilful creation of
a certain quality of interaction with others. It describes the junzi’s task as bringing focus to
everyday affairs (zhong yong), and the text’s opening passage suggests this focus be understood
affectively—as a dynamic balancing of emotions in the course of daily activity. Strikingly, the
text distinguishes the practical task of bringing focus to everyday affairs from the more overtly
political tasks of rulership.36 Zhongyong 20 points out that becoming a junzi requires a focus on
one’s kin (shiqin) and that this in turn requires “zhiren” (知人)—an understanding of people or
an ability to interact with them, to bring to fruition what exists only in incipient form. Here what
is brought to fruition might include shared affective experiences indicated by terms such as le.
To achieve this across the multiple social and interpersonal interactions that make up the course
of the day is to realize a form of human flourishing constituted by events or occasions. In this
way the natural cadence and flow of the day, understood as an ongoing series of social
interactions with multiple people, mirrors Whitehead’s more metaphysical picture of events.
There are challenges to approaching the classical Confucian tradition in this way. Clearly,
delight is not a simple good in the texts,37 nor is it the only important affective state—le is only
one of several affective states emphasized in Zhongyong 1. There are limits to the guidance
provided by music and affective states in Confucian society.38 On the other hand, perhaps 樂 le is
best understood not as a single emotion, but as referring to a range of related states, such as
delight, ease, and contentment, which might collectively constitute a mood or state of mind.
Ultimately, perhaps the creation of affect-laden social events is best understood as merely one
ethical task within a broader Confucian ethical vision. Indeed, perhaps there is no single
Confucian goal or paradigm but merely a cluster of related values and approaches.
10

Roger Ames and his collaborators, David Hall and Henry Rosemont, Jr., building on
earlier New Confucians like Tang Junyi, have excelled in articulating the place of the aesthetic in
classical Confucian ethical and social thought. Looking forward, it is possible to extend this
approach by reconsidering the meaning of “aesthetic,” shifting the focus from intuitively sensed
judgment of particulars to the practical goal of shared affective experiences realized in everyday
social life.
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